Eisenkot's Coalition Strategy Flips: From Draft Demands to Haredi Negotiations
Gadi Eisenkot eases opposition stance on ultra-Orthodox military service to secure coalition partners and unseat Netanyahu.
The Strategy Shift: What Changed and Why
Israeli opposition candidate Gadi Eisenkot said on Friday he was making "significant progress" in forming a government to oust Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as one of his possible coalition partners walked back demands that ultra-Orthodox Jews complete military service and signalled a willingness to hold talks with the community. This marks a dramatic pivot from the opposition bloc's pre-election positioning.
Just weeks ago, Liberman put up posters during the campaign vowing to crack down on the "draft-dodgers", and during an appearance earlier this year, he described ultra-Orthodox Jews as "anti-jewish" for their demands. That rhetorical warfare has evaporated into coalition math.
The arithmetic is unforgiving. Neither Netanyahu nor opposition chief Gadi Eisenkot reached a majority in the October 27 election, with Israeli society highly polarised over Netanyahu's leadership and worn down by three years of war. Eisenkot's core bloc of four Zionist parties holds only 48 seats out of 120 needed for a majority. The path to power now runs through Jerusalem's ultra-Orthodox yeshiva halls.
The Numbers: Then and Now
Following the meetings, Herzog said representatives of factions totaling 67 lawmakers backed Eisenkot, while factions totaling 46 lawmakers recommended Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These numbers reveal the opposition's fragmentation. Eisenkot's jewish-led bloc controls 48 seats; the Arab parties, 19. That's 67 seats—but Arab party inclusion remains politically toxic with centrist voters.
His party and the other ultra-Orthodox formation, Shas, together have 13 seats, enough to put Eisenkot in power. The ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism alone holds seven seats. A coalition pairing Eisenkot's 48 seats with UTJ's seven would yield 55 seats—requiring only the abstention of Arab parties to clear the 61-seat threshold for a simple majority.
This is why "Eisenkot is going all out to convince the ultra-Orthodox parties, both Shas and United Torah Judaism, to enter the government," according to coalition sources. The political math has made the haredi parties indispensable.
Eisenkot's Non-Negotiable Principles: The Facade Cracks
Before the election, Eisenkot outlined four core principles for any coalition partner. These principles include recognizing Israel as a jewish and democratic state, accepting the values enshrined in Israel's Declaration of Independence, mandatory military or civilian service, and recognizing Hamas as a terrorist organization.
The military service demand was weaponised during the campaign. There is a draft law for all citizens of Israel for military, national and civil service, and he only plans on exempting 3% of exceptional prodigies in Torah, science, music and sports out of every draft cohort. This wasn't wiggle room—it was a hard line drawn in coalition sand.
Yet last Friday, that principle underwent recalibration. Yashar chief Gadi Eisenkot on Friday stood by his four demands for any party interested in joining a coalition he was working to build, including one mandating national service for all Israelis, after Yisrael Beytenu chief Avigdor Liberman opened the door to a government with the ultra-Orthodox parties, who are bitterly opposed to the idea of drafting Haredi youth. The language of "standing by" masks a strategic opening. Eisenkot didn't drop his demands; he made room for negotiation.
Why Liberman's About-Face Signals Real Coalition Movement
Avigdor Liberman's party, Yisrael Beiteinu, won only seven seats this election—the fewest among five core opposition parties. His political survival depends on coalition inclusion. Liberman has appeared more lenient about joining a coalition with the haredi parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, and the support of the haredi parties could open a path for the opposition bloc to form a government.
This isn't generosity. It's calculation. Liberman's shift signals to Netanyahu that haredi parties might abandon his coalition entirely. Ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism plans to offer the opposition leader support for prime minister if he backs a military draft exemption law, even as final election results await certification. The ultra-Orthodox are now in play as genuine power brokers, not guaranteed Netanyahu allies.
The Before/After Coalition Landscape: What Governance Looks Like
Pre-Election Coalition Logic (October 2026 Campaign): Eisenkot built his campaign on explicit rejection of haredi power. The opposition bloc promised a government of "Zionist parties"—code for Jewish-only coalition partners. Draft demands were a core differentiator from Netanyahu, who had granted military exemptions to ultra-Orthodox men since 2022.
Post-Election Coalition Reality (November 2026): The math has rewritten the script. A scenario has gained traction that would bring the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism party into the coalition while relying on outside support from the Arab Ra'am party, and for Eisenkot, such a government could provide valuable breathing room, allowing him to stabilize the coalition and potentially expand it later, perhaps by bringing in the ultra-Orthodox Shas party once Netanyahu is no longer prime minister.
The trade-off is stark: Eisenkot gets to remove Netanyahu without depending on Arab party votes (a political kiss of death in centrist circles). The haredi parties get legislative breathing room on conscription. The cost to Eisenkot's campaign narrative is real but manageable because his core voters—the 2021 anti-Netanyahu coalition—prioritised unseating the premier above all else.
Historical Parallel: The 2021 Coalition That Rewrote the Rules
This is not Israel's first coalition dance with ideological compromise. In 2021, following the October 7 attacks, the opposition party National Unity joined the government to form an emergency national unity coalition, with Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot joining the newly formed war cabinet. That government lasted three years despite deep fractures. The coalition's stability was repeatedly tested by internal ideological fractures, most notably regarding the politically volatile issue of Haredi military conscription.
The 2021 experience taught Israeli opposition strategists a lesson: Coalitions built on shared enemies (Netanyahu) last longer than coalitions built on shared values. Eisenkot's pivot reflects that learning. Removing Netanyahu is the glue. Everything else—draft law, Arab party inclusion, haredi demands—becomes negotiable once the primary goal is within reach.
The Practical Sticking Points: What Still Divides
United Torah Judaism has demanded that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secure final Knesset approval of the haredi draft law before coalition negotiations begin, but has declined to clarify whether it would impose the same condition on Gadi Eisenkot, and a central question has emerged: Will the haredi party also demand that Eisenkot pass the draft law in all three Knesset readings before talks begin, as it has demanded of Netanyahu?
This uncertainty works in Eisenkot's favour. If UTJ insists on advance passage of a draft law, they risk alienating his secular and centrist coalition partners. If they don't demand it, they appear weak to their voter base. Political observers believe Eisenkot could offer the haredi parties generous terms regarding the conscription of yeshiva students, alongside funding and agreements on other issues important to them.
The Arab party dilemma remains unsolved. 70 percent of Jewish Israelis oppose the inclusion of an Arab party in the government. Yet if United Torah Judaism with its 7 seats shifts its support from Netanyahu's coalition to the change bloc, Eisenkot could secure a plurality, provided the Arab parties at least abstain, and Eisenkot would need active support from Ra'am, the more moderate of the two Arab parties, which previously joined the coalition that replaced Netanyahu in 2021 and has made integration into Israeli society a central part of its platform, alongside an abstention or support from outside the coalition, by the Joint List.
Timeline of the Coalition Shift
| Date/Period | Eisenkot Position | Coalition Status |
|---|---|---|
| March–September 2026 (Campaign) | Ultra-Orthodox conscription a "red line"; campaign rhetoric against haredi exemptions | Opposition bloc unified on Zionist-only coalition; Arab party support considered radioactive |
| October 27, 2026 (Election Day) | Yashar wins 21 seats; opposition bloc reaches 48 seats total | Eisenkot 13 seats short of majority without Arab parties or haredi partners |
| October 29–November 3, 2026 | Four Jewish opposition parties meet; agree to explore haredi negotiations as "alternative path" | Shift from "Zionist majority" rhetoric to "any bloc that accepts four principles" |
| November 5, 2026 | President Herzog assigns Eisenkot mandate to form government; receives 67 MK recommendations | Arab parties back him; haredi parties silent but open to talks |
| November 6, 2026 (Today) | Claims "significant progress" with haredi parties; Liberman says coalition with haredim preferable to Arab reliance | Coalition negotiations accelerate; draft law becomes subject to future negotiation, not precondition |
What This Means for Olim and Israel's Political Stability
For new immigrants watching Israeli politics from abroad, this coalition dance signals something important: Israeli governments form through pragmatic power-sharing, not ideological purity. The opposition ran on removing Netanyahu; the mechanics of how they remove him—whether through haredi partners, Arab abstention, or a mix—are secondary.
If Eisenkot succeeds, his government will face immediate pressure on three fronts: haredi conscription law (likely to be softened), Arab representation (likely to occur outside formal coalition), and security policy (where Eisenkot has broad party support). This is not a government of idealists. It is a government of survivors, patching together a majority sufficient to function.
For families planning aliyah, the question is stability. Israeli governments formed on anti-incumbent coalitions historically outlast ideologically unified ones. The 2021 Bennett-Lapid coalition, built on anti-Netanyahu sentiment, lasted 21 months despite haredi exit. An Eisenkot coalition built on the same foundation could last longer if he manages the haredi and Arab dynamics skillfully.
FAQ: Haredi Coalition Questions Answered
Q1: Will Eisenkot definitely pass a haredi draft law if he becomes PM? No. His coalition may include haredi parties, but he will need buy-in from secular and centrist coalition partners. The most likely outcome is a compromise that requires some conscription but grants exemptions beyond the current 3% baseline. This satisfies no one completely but allows all parties to claim victory.
Q2: Why did Liberman change his position on haredi parties so quickly? Liberman's party won only seven seats, making him vulnerable in coalition negotiations. Supporting haredi inclusion strengthens his hand against Netanyahu and gives him leverage with Eisenkot. It's political calculus, not conviction.
Q3: Can Eisenkot govern with only ultra-Orthodox support and Arab abstention? Yes. 48 Zionist seats + 7 UTJ seats = 55 seats. With Arab parties abstaining (not voting), he clears the 61-seat threshold via simple majority. However, this requires that Arab parties don't join Netanyahu's counter-coalition, which explains the ongoing behind-scenes talks with Ra'am.
Q4: What happens if these coalition talks collapse? Another election is possible, but unlikely in the near term. Following the Arab parties' achievement of 19 seats in the election, they may have an interest in avoiding another round of elections. A minority Eisenkot government supported from outside by Arab parties is the fallback, even though it contradicts his campaign messaging.
The Bottom Line: Pragmatism Over Ideology
Eisenkot's coalition strategy hasn't failed—it has adapted. What looked like a firm line on haredi conscription has become a negotiating position. The opposition bloc's promise of a "Zionist majority" has evolved into a coalition that may include haredi partners if the math requires it. This is how Israeli politics works in reality: campaign promises bend to electoral outcomes; ideology yields to arithmetic; principle surrenders to survival.
The opposition will likely form a government within weeks. It will not resemble the one Eisenkot campaigned for. But it will achieve what his voters demanded: Netanyahu's removal from power. For Eisenkot, that is victory enough. For the haredi parties, it is leverage. For Israel's political system, it is proof that even deep ideological divides can be bridged when the alternative—another election—is unacceptable to enough players.
Further reading: Making Aliyah 2026: Process, Costs, Sal Klita, Documents — AliyaToday.
Further reading: Foreign Buyers: Unlock 75% Jerusalem Financing With Aliyah Declaration — Jewish Property Report.
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